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Creditable behaviour? The intra-
firm management of trade credit
Rebecca Boden
Business School, University of Roehampton, London, UK, and
Salima Yassia Paul
School of Management, University of Plymouth, Plymouth, UK
Abstract
Purpose – This paper aims to explore the reasons for the apparent failure ofmanyUKfirms to achieve
the competitive advantages indicated in largely positivist literature through the management of their
trade credit positions.
Design/methodology/approach – The paper utilises data from a set of semi-structured interviews
with trade creditmanagers in firms and is the first substantial qualitative study of the intra-firmaspects
of trade credit management in the UK. Through this approach, we explore the reasons why the
theoretical promise of trade credit may or may not be realised.
Findings – The principal findings relate to the importance of three organisational attributes (skills/
awareness, communication and structural position of the activity in the firm). That is, trade credit
management should be regarded as a relational activity and notmerely a narrow technical function. The
paper finds that there is no generic formulation of these attributes that can deliver on the promise of
trade credit identified in the extant literature. Rather, individual firms must adapt themselves to suit
their circumstances.
Practical implications – This paper will be of interest to and is relevant for companies, accounting
professionals and policymakers. Trade credit represents a significant area of commercial risk, and the
problems experienced with its effective management have previously proved somewhat intractable.
Originality/value – This paper reports on the first substantial piece of UK work to look at the
actualities of how trade credit is managed within firms and what the implications of this are.
Keywords Trade credit, Information asymmetries, Customer relationships, Financing costs, Skills,
Communication, Structural position
Paper type Research paper
1. Introduction
Current global economic difficulties provide an imperative for firms to improveworking
capital management – especially the appropriate management of buying and selling on
credit to customerswhomay have a reduced capacity orwillingness to pay on time. Late
or non-payment can slow or fatally rupture cash-conversion cycles. Trade credit
represents a significant risk; in the UK, over 80 per cent of business-to-business sales are
on credit, and receivables constitute a major part of firms’ total assets (Wilson and
Summers, 2002).
The strategic management of firms’ net credit position, defined as the balance
between credit taken (accounts payable) and credit given (accounts receivable), goes
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well beyond cash flow control. Managed effectively, trade credit can also confer
competitive advantage in terms of information and signalling, customer relationships
and financing of working capital (Paul and Boden, 2011).
There is ample, normatively-determined theory of how effective trade credit
management should work (Paul and Boden, 2008). However, there is also considerable
disparity between theory and many firms’ practices. Accordingly, consideration of how
internal organisational attributes impact on the ability to manage trade credit for
competitive advantage (Mian and Smith, 1992; Paul and Boden, 2008; Pike et al., 2005)
forms the focus of this paper, which necessarily adopts a qualitative approach to access
data on how firms work at a micro-level. We draw on data collected for a major
qualitative study of UK firms’ trade credit policies and practices in which we conducted
40 semi-structured interviews with credit managers/controllers from firms of varying
size and sectors in 2010 and 2011 (Paul and Boden, 2012). Details of respondents are
provided in Appendix 1.
In Section 2, we detail how the predominantly normative and quantitative positivist
literature suggests that effective trade credit management can reduce information
asymmetries, build and sustain customer relationships and reduce financing costs.
These aspects are then counterpoised against three organisational attributes of firms
found to be significant in our empirical study: skills and awareness of trade credit,
communication and the structural position of the credit function in the firm. In Section 3,
we present three contrasting pairs of firms from our empirical study, one for each of the
theoretical potentialities of trade credit and analyse these in terms of their
organisational attributes. This is followed by a discussion.
2. Making credit work
The management of trade credit can be narrowly viewed as a simple business function
utilising a range of expert technical knowledge. In this form, it can even be
dis-embedded from the organisation and outsourced to debt factors, payment services
and credit collection agencies. Such approaches involve high degrees of specification
(for instance, of credit terms or even of Information Technology (IT) payment systems)
and low degrees of discretion, negotiation or even face-to-face involvement.
For such highly structured and routinised functional approaches to work well, firms
need either market dominance or a vital role in the supply chain (by virtue of product or
position) so that they can be relatively inflexible with regard to credit terms. Few firms
are likely to enjoy such advantages, certainly with regard to all of their customers and
suppliers. To gain a competitive advantage from trade credit management, most firms
must have more flexible, relational approaches. Three possible advantages of such
relational approaches can be identified:
(1) the mitigation of information asymmetries;
(2) the building of stronger customer relationships; and
(3) financial control.
We now discuss each of these in turn.
Information and signalling
Signalling theory suggests that trade credit data can be useful in correcting information
asymmetrieswhere suppliers are unsurewhether the buyer intends to pay on time or not
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(Ng et al., 1999; Paul and Boden, 2008), allowing early identification of potential
problems (Smith, 1987). For example, if buyers fail to make use of an early payment
discount, this indicates possible cash-flow problems. Trade credit can therefore serve as
a “trip wire to alert the supplier of deterioration in the buyer’s creditworthiness”
(Petersen and Rajan, 1997, p. 663).
Trade credit can also signal product quality. Firms with established reputations for
quality tend to extend less trade credit than those that need to prove quality (Long et al.,
1993; Pike and Cheng, 2001) – “trade credit may be viewed as the strongest form of
product warranty”, as it gives buyers the option of not paying if they are not satisfied
with the quality (Lee and Stowe, 1993, p. 286).
Customer relationships
Trade credit can provide information about customers and help to build relationships
with them (Paul and Boden, 2011; Paul and Wilson, 2006; Wilson, 2008; Wilson and
Summers, 2002). It is:
[…] an important strategic or competitive tool that plays a role in capturing new business, in
building supplier-customer relationships, in signalling product quality, “reputation” and
financial health and in price competition and price discrimination (Peel et al., 2000, p. 17).
There is a strong positive correlation between the credit period offered to customers and
the strength of customer relationships as suppliers invest in those with whom they have
a long-term alliance (Paul, 2010).
Costs of finance
Finally, efficient trade credit management can cut firms’ costs because knowledge of
customers’ behaviour gained from payment patterns leads to more accurate cash flow
forecasts, reducing holding requirements and therefore decreasing the cost of
precautionary balances (Pike and Cheng, 2001). Schwartz (1974, p. 643) argues that
“trade credit gives the buyers time to plan for the payment of unexpected purchases,
enables them to forecast future cash outlays with greater certainty and simplifies their
cash-flow management”. Firms can benefit if bills are paid simultaneously, as this
reduces transaction costs (Schwartz, 1974).
Trade credit can therefore compensate firms with weaker market positions and roles
in the supply chain by improving information availability, building strong supply
chains and mitigating costs. However, this begs the question of trade credit
arrangements that firms have to have in place to achieve this potential. Our empirical
study (Paul and Boden, 2012) identified three main organisational factors that affected
firms’ ability to achieve these strategic advantages: skills and awareness,
communication and the structural position of the function in the firm. We now describe
each of these in turn.
Skills and awareness
We found considerable heterogeneity in the skills and training of trade credit staff (Paul
and Boden, 2012). Some were professionally qualified and had membership of, for
example, the Institute of Credit Management; those without formal training sometimes
had good skills acquired “on the job”. For small business owners in particular, skills
were largely self-taught and intuitive.
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Where trade credit was treated as a back-office function, staff awareness of the
strategic potentiality of relational modes of working was often commensurately lower,
and staff skills poorer. In contrast, in some firms, staff had acted as “champions” for
trade credit, raising awareness and converting organisational behaviour and ethos.
These staff were proactive in customer relationship-building and were able to work
flexibly to achieve mutually beneficial outcomes.
Finally, sheer staff numbers could also be influential. In a number of firms, trade
credit had been significantly outsourced; these firms often simply did not have staff
physically present who could act as advocates for relational ways of working.
Communication
We found that the skills and capacities of specialist staff and their position within their
firms to a significant extent determined how effectively the strategic advantages of
trade credit were communicated to co-workers and customers. In turn, this had an
impact on the extent to which good trade credit practices were embedded with the
organisation. Because trade credit impacts on every aspect of a firm’s activities, the
ability to share credit information on customers to support decision-making information
flows was of crucial importance. Likewise, communication between firms and their
customers on credit issues was also key – some firms were energetic in their education
of customers and in building good credit relationships with them.
Structural position within the firm
To manage trade credit for strategic advantage, the function must be appropriately
positioned within the firm and the staff sufficiently influential such that credit
management considerations are central to key decision-making (Paul and Boden, 2012).
If the credit management function is a residual process following sales transactions, it
cannot be influential. Similarly, reporting lines are important, as they give access to key
decision-makers. Finally, the existence and implementation of formal trade credit
policies and procedures, even if these allow significant discretion, act as a locus of power.
These overlapping organisational aspects are crucial to the strategic use of trade
credit management in terms of mitigating information asymmetries, building customer
relationships and in financing. In the following section, we present exemplars of
excellent and poor practice from our empirical work that illustrate the role of these
organisational attributes in each of the areas of information asymmetry, customer
relationships and finance. All firms have been anonymised.
3. Theoretical ideals and firm reality
We now present a cross-sectional analysis, taking each of the potential advantages of
trade credit posited by theory and considering how organisational attributes affect the
realisation of these advantages.
Rebalancing information asymmetries
Bascule is a long-established company providing highly skilled technical consulting
services to the construction sector. An employee-owned organisation in sound financial
health, it has no debt-financing and has a broad customer base. As is common with the
construction sector in the UK, the normal payment periods for trade debts are lengthy –
between 60 and 90 days.
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Bascule has a well-qualified trade credit team actively involved in the firm’s
operations:
We always saywe’re a little bit like dustmen. You know,we’re there, we fix something, nobody
knows what we do, but if we didn’t do it then it would become apparent (Credit manager,
Bascule).
The large number of high-value international projects in which Bascule is engaged
present serious potential financial risks, which are mitigated by the credit team having
a keen awareness of their operating environment. The credit manager evidenced a keen
understanding of the complexities and nuanced nature of the business, and saw himself
as “translating” between technical colleagues and the commercial departments. Hence,
part of the skill was in adopting a flexible and agile approach to suit the local
environment.
Skills, therefore, can be construed both in terms of technical knowledge and the
ability of staff to interpolate themselves into the organisation in a useful way:
We know the good and the bad, we know how to deal with them […] so yes, I mean if you look
at the credit management team […] tied up within that is quite a lot of knowledge […] so if
we’re going toworkwith a particular company, andwe haven’t beenworkingwith thembefore
I can ask the team and each person will have [an answer to the question] “what are these guys
like?” […]Within that team there is a lot of intelligence as to who are the goodies and who are
the baddies […] we are seen as people who know our stuff […] generally we are well regarded
within the company in terms of the job we do (Credit manager, Bascule).
The fact that Bascule is employee-owned made a considerable difference to the credit
team’s ability to deploy its knowledge. Bascule is non-hierarchical and employees share
a sense of responsibility for commercial success, which translated into profit-shares:
Because it’s employee-owned and because everybody has, in theory, the best interests of the
firm at heart, that if you say to somebody, “Look, there is a big risk that there is going to be a
problem” […] it affects people’s bonus, but also it affects people’s reputation because nobody
wants to be seen as the person who’s lost the money (Credit manager, Bascule).
The credit function supported thework of the firm rather than being a part of its primary
offer to customers; Bascule did not use trade credit to win customers. Despite this, the
credit team was, nonetheless, as the manager put it:
[…] very much part of the process […] We have monthly meetings with senior managers at
each of the parts of the company, so wewill go and discuss key problems once amonth […] we
don’t like to hog the limelight.We liked to get the credit for doing a quiet job in the background
(Credit manager, Bascule).
For instance, the credit managers are formally involved at initial contract negotiation
stages and in undertaking risk assessments, etc. In doing this, they deploy their
knowledge of the sector and playerswithin it.Most of the influence that could bewielded
by the credit function was derived not from any formal structural position, but by
working alongside and with colleagues with other responsibilities. The credit manager
described how the team had developed “a partnership approach with the [Bascule] sales
people because ultimately that’s mutually beneficial”.
Bascule’s longstanding customer relationships allowed the credit team to develop
enhanced knowledge of them. The extended nature of serial subcontracting meant that
it was necessary to have a nuanced knowledge of the whole supply chain network. The
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credit team had this and, because of their skills and position with the firm, were able to
communicate their knowledge to colleagues:
To give you an example, one I saw yesterday, I put an email together to explain concerns and
got an email back this morning to say “This is understood” […] So, if you think about it, we
almost (sic) providing an internal consultancy service because we are providing advice to
people about potential pitfalls but we are not saying to them “do this, don’t do this” because
you’ve got to remember these guys are very senior. Credit control here is more about
relationship building (Credit manager, Bascule).
Bascule also purchased goods and services – althoughmostly this was items like travel,
etc. The firm prided itself on being good payers because it was keen to sustain a
reputation for being good to do business with. The credit manager felt that by giving
suppliers information about itself, it would secure better deals.
In contrast, Ankole is one of the largest UK food manufacturing companies. This
traditionally structured company had a very large and varied customer base, ranging
from individuals to major retailers and service providers. Ankole has acquired
dominance by absorbing smaller competitors. About 90 per cent of sales are on credit.
The companywasmarked by a surprisingly poor ability to adequately control credit:
I think economic crisis had a big part of it and I think they’ve realised that there’sway toomuch
risk […] and should it go wrong or tits up (as the saying goes) we’re in deep trouble, because I
mean they have millions and millions of pounds just sitting there, um, not collected (Credit
controller, Ankole).
Unlike Bascule, Ankole had a poorly qualified and dispersed credit control team. The
numbers and range of Ankole’s customers posed information asymmetry challenges in
terms of tracking and monitoring large numbers of customers and the need for agile
credit knowledge spanning a variety of business environments. These, together with
Ankole’s substantial size, produced an imperative for proactive credit control with high
levels of skills and awareness. However, the company’s market dominance, and the
plenitude of customers, had led to complacency.
Ankole’s trade credit function was in some disarray. A senior credit controller
reported that he had received just two weeks of training from the firm and had yet to
complete a professional qualification in credit management. The credit function was
isolated from the rest of the business andwas essentially used as a debt-chasing service.
This made it difficult to develop requisite knowledge about the firm’s business and its
customers. Ankole had only recently started to help staff to develop necessary technical
skills and there was, as yet, little evident opportunity to deploy these. The credit team
had poor knowledge of the basic terms on which credit was given because these
decisions were taken by others without the team’s involvement. Ankole’s large and
diverse customer base obviously embodied a huge amount of data, but posed challenges
in terms of its collection and processing into useful information.
The problems went beyond the fact that the credit control team did not have the
requisite level of skill to know the customers and inform company strategy. The firm
had grown by acquisition and many of the systems in use for tracking customers and
their debts were incompatible:
You’ve got three different accounting systems for the business, there’s not just one […] so
you’ve got three different types of reports, information’s all different, there’s nothing the same
[…] because the depot don’t see the accounts any more, it’s all done in head office and you can
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imagine how many hundreds of thousands there are. There’s a team of […] about four with a
manager doing hundreds […] well a hundred and eighty five thousand customers (Credit
Controller, Ankole).
Sales personnel worked on a commission basis, leading to an almost blatant disregard
for information sharing that led to problems with even basic credit control:
The [ledger] I’ve got now is so much smaller, but the accounts are held in the sites, so the only
way to actually get the information is to go to the sites, so because the people in the sites aren’t
necessarily credit controllers […]when something goeswrong they don’t knowwhat to do and
then instead of asking they keep quiet and then […] when the reports come through each week
you just see the graph goingway high and, and now I travel around literally and just deal with
them (Credit controller, Ankole).
This poor communication cut both ways – the credit team were so unsure about their
own policies and procedures that there is little evidence that they were able to
communicate these effectively to the sales staff. Asked if the sales department decided
who to extend credit to, our respondent replied:
Oh no, “we” decide, but they pick and choose who they send through on application […] Of the
300 accounts that we have where we’ve not seen credit applications for them, that’s sales […]
doing a dodgy […] Sales will! They’ll go out, do what they have to do. What they’re meant to
do is obviously get the customers, do a credit form, if they want credit, send it in to us, and
before we even supply them, that has to be accepted or declined. That doesn’t happen. So
there’s no credit agreements, it’s all done on […] goodwill […] [verbally] […] which is useless.
[In] six months [my colleague] had 500 gains of business, yet only 20 applications had gone
through the credit department (Credit Controller, Ankole).
Not only was there poor control of the basic data around customers, this information
was not used in any strategic sense to develop the business, allowing large and powerful
customers to call the shots:
The amount of discount they take’s obscene. You’ve got settlement discount, volume discount,
retention discount […] you can get a remittance, say, it is […] the bottom figure’s £70,000. I’ve
seen it and then at the very top you’ve got minus 20, 40 […] so the actual value of it is probably
near £130,000, so they’ve just deducted so much money. Just because they can (Credit
Controller, Ankole).
Ankole’s failure to correct information asymmetries was closely related to both the poor
skills and knowledge possessed by the credit team and their structural position within
the firm. The credit function was decentralised, pressed for staff, a sub-division of
finance, and relegated to debt collecting. Efforts to collect debt proactively were
shunned by senior management, yet on occasions these approaches had proved
effective:
It’s debateable sometimes whether [sales] have actually done all they can. So I always ring the
customer and say, “What do you want? I’ll sign [the third-party collection order] now or you
can work with me”. Most of the time […] they’ll just say, ‘I don’t want the aggravation, I’ll just
pay’, so I give them the number and they just go off and pay it, but some of them […] a few
colourful words, the phone goes down and then […] just sign [the third party collection order]
off and send it off (Credit Controller, Ankole).
Late payment decisions regarding write-offs or renegotiating contracts were ultimately
resolved by the senior management – to whom the credit controllers had little or no
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direct access. There had been an obvious push in response to cash difficulties, but this
was top-down rather than the result of a restructuring of the function.
Building customer relationships
Dikka is a large and long-established limited liability partnership providing design
services on (mostly) major construction projects. The partnership basis means that
senior personnel are all closely involved in building organisational value. Dikka’s small
customer base mostly comprises large organisations across the world. The projects
have complicated, multi-partner supply chains, making customer relationships
long-term, long-distance and multi-faceted – they were described by our respondent as
“somewhat tortuous” to negotiate. Although all of Dikka’s work is on credit, until five
years ago it had no dedicated credit management function and very poor performance in
this area. Since then, the company had taken a number of effective steps to address this
perceived deficiency.
Our respondent, the most senior credit manager, was an Institute of Credit
Management (an organisation of trade credit professionals) fellow with 25 years’
experience, and nationally recognised in his professional community. He had a keen
awareness of the role of the credit function:
[The customers] know and you know that actually the relationship is too valuable to be
compromised, our projects last for four and five years and, if you fall out with the client then,
you know, you’ve got a damaged relationship that you’ve got to work with for four or five
years. So it’s always the value judgement (Group credit nanager, Dikka).
Information was perceived as a key element in building these relationships:
My team build up that intelligence from that sort of collection route […] and they get to know
the key people in that. I’m very keen that they develop relationships with those customers
(Group credit manager, Dikka).
Awareness of the credit management team’s ability to build customer relationships
were formally communicated to the rest of the company via a comprehensive credit
policy, introduced and implemented by the creditmanager. This policywas endorsed by
senior management and integrated into the corporate governance structure.
The skills of the credit team are evidenced by the way in which this policy was not a
one-way process. Given the complexity and nature of the contracts, it was:
[…] quite difficult to apply a blanket policy […] you need to know how to adapt it to specific
circumstances, this needs skills, experience and awareness of what goes on in your company
and in your sector (Group credit manager, Dikka).
This credit manager prided himself on working well with other functional areas in the
firm. It had taken time and effort to reach this position, and he had been forced to work
slowly to achieve a change in organisational ethos. Consequently, credit management
was proactively embedded in the firm and the group credit manager was a board
member. Dikka has no sales department as such – the “salesmen are the partners in the
firm, the senior directors […] spend a lot of time building relationshipswith their client”.
In this partnership, the classic tension that can develop between sales and credit
management did not emerge – those intent on procuring and retaining customers were
also mindful of the profit imperative. Credit management was accorded a respectful
position in the organisation:
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We’re not going to destroy your [the partners’] relationship with your clients, what we are
going to do is enhance themand how?We’re going to enhance thembygiving youX,Y, Z.Most
of these guys are actually really grateful that they’re getting better intelligence on the clients
that they’re going to be dealing with (Group Credit Manager, Dikka).
The group credit manager was closely integrated into decision-making, providing
intelligence and strategic direction. He differentiated those clients that genuinely need
some leeway due to short-term issues and those that have:
[…] obviously taken the commercial decision that actually we can improve our treasury
position by not paying people and if we’ve got to pay a few court fees, well that’s what we’ve
got to do. [One major customer was] absolutely unscrupulous. They called together all of their
consultants, said, “We need you to drop your fees by 40 per cent” […] there was a stunned
silence round the room and people asked, “Well do you expect a 40 per cent reduction in service
then?”, “No, no, we expect you to do the same job. We believe that our position is such that we
can ask for this reduction and if you don’t want to do it then there’ll be somebody else out there
who does”. We wrote back to them and said, “We can’t do 40 per cent, we can give you x%
reduction, but you won’t get this that and the other AND you have to guarantee to pay to
terms” and they accepted (Group Credit Manager, Dikka).
Awareness, experience of dealingwith such large client, and the organisational status of this
credit management team allowed it to take a key role in such a risky decision.
Manzetti is a well-established large public company providing services to a very diverse
customer base ranging frommultinationals to individuals.With the exception of a few very
large business customers, the size of the customer base precluded close customer
relationships and generated a high degree of separation between sales and credit
management. A large number of customer-facing functions, including some credit
management ones, were outsourced, often internationally.
Consequently, Manzetti operated back-office debt collection rather than proactive credit
management– it hada “BillingDirector” rather thanacreditmanager.Whereas inDikka the
credit workers were closely involved in building relationships with customers, in Manzetti
they were debt collectors; their only contact with customers was when pursuing payment.
Theskillsandaptitudesof thecreditworkerswere largelyappropriateonly to this limited
work.Debtmonitoring and collection is highly automated. Consequently, there are fewstaff,
and with few skills, in the credit area.
The company does no risk analysis of customers or in-depth reports of defaulters:
There are lot of customers and it makes it difficult from a credit management point of view to be
personal with those customers and build a good relationship. It’s more reliant on systems and
technology to help you with the collections really […] moving into more of a sort of IT managing
solutions and complex networks (Billing/Business Enterprise Team leader, Manzetti).
Nor did the credit department collect and collate information on customers, even
poor-payers:
There’s not really systems in place to warn you of these potential wrong-doers or potential
customers that are going out of business other than the press watch which is not always that
reliable. (Billing/Business Enterprise Team leader, Manzetti).
The credit teamwere not able to provide detailed information on customer behaviour:
Due to the volumes it’s so hard to keep track of the customers but we will have system
generated ratings as such […] You’ll see the invoices and when they paid and you can just
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build up a picture, but I don’t think as a whole […] I don’t think there’s really a dedicated team
anywhere who will keep track (Billing/Business Enterprise Team leader, Manzetti).
Manzetti confused customer service and debt collection, putting strain on credit
management:
So if you ring up and say, “I’m from credit management”, it sounds a bit debt collector-ish! The
customer’s going to be a little bit, ‘Hang on, so they’re after the money rather than […] I’ve had
all these issues, aren’t you going to help me resolve them?’, rather than ask for money (Billing/
Business Enterprise Team leader, Manzetti).
The company uses third-party agents to deal with bad debts, denying itself the opportunity
for direct customer contact:
The debt collection agency makes an absolute fortune, a killing, off us because […] I don’t
think it’s somuch a failing of our creditmanagement process. Itmight be becausewe’ve got too
many customers and not enough credit managers and maybe not a robust enough billing
system (Billing/Business Enterprise Team leader, Manzetti).
Manzetti, with its extensive customer base, has not systematised its credit management
operations. Therewas also a feeling that the credit functionwas, quite simply, understaffed.
Communications between the credit teams and other significant departments, such as sales,
were poor. Until quite recently, the sales workers had been on a commission basis and
evidenced little concern if a customer was a bad payer:
There are actually commission corporate clawbacks now, so if a customer doesn’t pay their bill for
whatever reason [the sale staff] lose their commission, so it has a flip side to it because yes it’s great
because the salesmanager is like an extra credit controller and they have the best contact with the
customer and the best relationship, but they are then the bane of your life because they’ll ring you
up [complaining that they can’t buy their kids Christmas presents] (Billing/Business Enterprise
Team leader, Manzetti).
Communications with customers fared little better. Many activities in the company are
outsourced, so customers rarely deal with the same person. Third-party sales agents
tended to concentrate on sales maximisation, regardless of the customer
creditworthiness. Smaller customers were left to the automated debt recovery systems
whilst the debt workers call:
[…] thebigger clientswhoweneed to really ringandpester formoneyrather than theoneswho just
won’t pay and you let the system take care of them so to speak and the call centres. The bigger
clientswill obviously get the calls, the personal touch, the human element of collections and it’s the
most effective way, but there’re not enough people and there’re too many customers. Even the big
clients, sometimes you have to rely on the automation (Billing/Business Enterprise Team leader,
Manzetti).
As a result, the company suffers badly from bad debts, with the:
[…] budget for a monthly write-off, it’s rarely ever understated […] the volumes of bad debt
and the write-offs that go through on a monthly basis is always over-budget or just not put
through that month because it simply is over the agreed limit of what can be written off
(Billing/Business Enterprise Team leader, Manzetti).
The absence of contact with customers meant that the credit team did not have detailed or
useful organised information on most customers. This meant that there was little
information shared with credit decision-makers:
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If I’m honest I don’t think we utilise it [information] enough, because of the sheer volume of
customers […] we try and communicate with the sales staff as much as possible, but there’s not
enough communication between the two, but in terms of the overall trends due to the volumes it’s
so hard to keep track of the customers (Billing/Business Enterprise Team leader, Manzetti).
Poor organisational positioning, where credit staff worked under pressure to get the initial
bills right to enhance customer service, but, at the same time, were mainly involved with
back-end collecting activities, created tensions. Increasing competition for customers was
matched by an inability to deal with specific consumer issues. In the past, for instance, the
credit team used to work out payment plans for customers struggling to pay. However, the
automation, twinned with the recession, means that these plans are almost impossible:
[…]togetauthorisedandnowthey’reunderalotmorescrutinyfromseniormanagement, they’llalways
ask us to get as much upfront as possible and it’s tricky to negotiate with customers when you know
there’s a genuine case, it’s definitely tricky (Billing/BusinessEnterpriseTeam leader,Manzetti).
So even if the credit teamwanted to use its initiative to help customers, it had little ability to
influence decisions. Moreover, their knowledge and awareness was lost in the largely
automated services.
Costs of finance
Redemptores isa large,well-establishedcompanysupplyingproducts/servicesbasedaroundthe
basic constructioncommodities that it produces. Involvedwithsomevery largeprojects, it is one
of the market leaders and sells to low credit-risk customers. Most transactions are on credit. A
conventionally structured, market-leading firm, Redemptores uses its efficient trade credit
management operation to successfullymitigate the cost of granting credit.
The highly skilled andqualified senior creditmanager explained that, aswell as the need for
skill and awareness, business acumenplayed an important role in reducing costs:
If you can secure major volumes of [products], then it’s sometimes worth giving away long credit
[…] but prior to doing that youwork outwhat the impact on your performance, cash-flow, risk […]
will it impact on bad debt provision? […]We’re there to be the policemen of the risk versus return
(senior credit manager, Redemptores).
Much skillwas deployed in negotiating anddetermining credit terms, prices, etc.A complex
cost-benefit analysis tool included a “nine-box matrix”, with parameters such as credit cost
vs volume, risk vs return, length vs price, limit vs risk, etc. However, such calculations
merely informed very competent staff who had the discretion to make decisions based on
experience and companyknowledge.Therewas a keen awareness ofmarket conditions and
how to successfully exploit these:
Somebodyonce accusedmeand said, “You’re just usingyour power in themarket” and I said, “Are
you expecting me to actually apologise for that? I’m powerful, but that is part and parcel of
capitalism”(Senior credit manager, Redemptores).
Given its powerful market position, Redemptores only entered contracts on the basis of
a reasonably assured financial return – customer relationship building was not a key
priority, but the company was committed to using credit to increase profitability.
Redemptores demanded financial reciprocity from major customers. One customer
wanted 60-days credit:
[…] butwe are receiving in reciprocation a guaranteed set of priceswhich gives us good profit and
in addition to that, we are receiving guaranteed volumes. So we’ve offset the two things, there’s
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benefit forus […]Wewill nothandout additional termswithout something in reciprocation (Senior
credit manager, Redemptores).
The credit department’smissionwas communicated throughout the firmand specific credit
information was shared via a weekly report. The senior credit manager described how the
credit policy has board approval and was “part of the strategic decision-making” – he
reported directly and regularly to the board on credit costs. The credit teamwas a principal
intermediary between customers and the rest of the firm, educating customers about
Redemptores’ requirements of them. They imposed a strict and proactive regime. Forward
intelligence on customers’ creditworthiness and payment behaviour enabled them to
concentrate on those most likely to delay payment, thereby reducing the cost of chasing.
Systems for customer communication had significantly reduced credit costs. An electronic
customer portal gave clients access to sophisticated account information, reducing queries
that are often the source of late payment.
As a result of excellent credit information, the team was able to keep daily close
control of credit costs. Tight control of the net credit position meant that credit from
Redemptores’ suppliers funded the cost of extending credit to customers. This involved
an aggressive stance, enabled by its dominant market position:
Yes, and we force other people to pay […] we pay them late, we have to protect our cash
position, pure and simple (Senior Credit Manager, Redemptores).
Structurally, the credit team is clearly an integral part of Redemptoresmodus operandi. The
head of the credit team is a board member and the team’s actions permeate and control all
aspects of business decision making.
Brolga is a medium-sized company manufacturing and distributing capital equipment
for thebuilt environment. Itwas experiencingfinancial difficulties, andmanyactivitieshave
been outsourced and staff numbers reduced. Brolga’s customer basewas very concentrated,
with some 45 per cent of business derived from 2 per cent of customers. Amain objective of
the firm was to expand its market share, which resulted in the company over-extending
itself. As a consequence, the cost of credit extended to customers escalated, as did costs
associated with late payment and default.
Six years ago the companydidnot have a credit team–decision-makingwas ona largely
ad hoc basis, resulting in a very poor trade credit position. The recently established credit
team had some members with evident skills and/or experience, but it was not part of the
credit decision-making. The credit manager said: “we have the knowhow to reduce credit
costs, improve our cash-flow forecast by better risk mitigation, but it’s all sales [team]
driven”.The sales teamwere extendinggenerous credit terms to attract customers, the costs
of which were not offset by sales/customer base growth.
Despite this poor position, Brolga had cut staff in the credit section from 16 to 6. Yet, the
companyhasawide customerbase,whichgeneratedmanydisputes that consumed the time
of credit staff and drew their efforts away from more strategic work. The skills and
capacities of the teamwere not widely recognised within Brolga and they were resented as
the “sales prevention” department. Consequently, the credit staff were not motivated to
develop their skills further:
I would love someone to come knocking on door saying, “Please support me to my Institute [of
CreditManagement] exams”. I’d love someone to say, “I’dwant your job infive/six years time”. I’ve
got nothing like that (Credit manager, Brolga).
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There was very poor communication of information between the credit team, the sales
and the rest of the company:
[Often] the first thing you knew about an order waswhen basically the lorrywas ready to take the
piece of machinery away and then suddenly it’s […] there’s an issue from a credit side (Credit
manager, Brolga).
Thecreditpolicy isnotusedandhadnotbeenupdatedsince2007.Thecredit teamdidgather
information onkey customers, but theywere not the decision-makers or the negotiators, and
although they shared this information with co-workers, nobody seemed to use it.
Consequently, no real analysis of late payment was performed – “It is certainly something
that we should be doing more to understand what is actually happening, but we don’t”
(creditmanager, Brolga). The credit teamhad limited power to use the information that they
collected from continual late payers, especially larger customers. “There’s the fear factor,
“well they won’t buy from us again”. Do we want people to buy from us who don’t pay? If
they don’t, then there is a cost” (Credit manager, Brolga).
The credit team felt that an issue here was that the sales staff were driven by a bonus
culture and suffered no adverse consequences for taking risky and costly credit decisions:
We have a salesmanager coming telling us that he didn’t knowwhat credit limit his customers
had got, “Well, you didn’t want the information when offered” […] you can lead a horse to
water, but you can’t make it drink (Credit manager, Brolga)
The creditmanager noted that, as the credit teamhas little power and no direct contactwith
customers, it is “verymuch further down […]weget involvedwhen [we] approve the orders,
but the problemwould be the negotiationwould have taken place by then”. For instance, the
credit policy sets out clearly the credit limits and how orders should be processed:
[…] but the problem is a customer doesn’t knowwhat that credit limit is and therefore how canwe
expect themto follow […] toplay thegame if theydon’t knowwhat the rules of thegameare?So the
terms and conditions are not communicated to the customers (Credit manager, Brolga).
The absence of a clear strategy for sales growth in the firm meant that “it sold to
anybody who comes knocking on its door” (Credit manager, Brolga). Consequently, the
credit team deals mainly with collection, disputed invoices and late payment. Brolga’s
credit manager described himself as “basically in charge of the collection team”. This
increased the cost of granting credit; in contrast to Redemptores, Brolga’s passive credit
management was not optimised to reduce costs.
Many of Brolga’s customers had no working capital facility so they “purely use trade
finance” and the credit team had no power to stop this – “why didn’t [the customer] pay to
terms? I didn’t ask, we know it’s a systemic issue” (credit manager, Brolga). Customers paid
at their conveniencewithout any penalty as the credit teamhad no power to charge interest,
put customers on stop, or even use any collection techniques to actively chase them:
You’ve got a big company that paid late, you charge them late payment interest and they don’t
pay it, what do you do? Well, you’re just being busy fools creating more costs and then you
have to write it off to interest (Credit manager, Brolga).
It’s breaking this culture that is difficult because I appreciate that it’s a sales driven business.
However, nowhere does it say in our policy thatwe expect customers to continually payus late […]
everybody has the occasion when they pay late, that’s OK, but if it’s continually paying late then
there has to be a consequence for the customer’s actions, but we don’t (Credit Manager, Brolga).
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In Brolga, because trade credit was seen as a simple debt collection function, it was not
used to generate cost advantage. The credit manager dealt mainly with dispute
resolution, late payment collection and writing off bad debts. He was neither highly
enough placed in the hierarchy to get the best value out of the trade credit operation nor
well placed to negotiate credit terms and conditions with customers.
4. Concluding discussion
Until relatively recently, trade credit management has been something of a Cinderella
subject – the subject of some normative academic research but often largely relegated to a
back-office technical function in firms (Paul and Boden, 2008). The current economic crisis
provides an imperative for firms to pay new attention to this area if they are achieve the
significant competitive advantages promised by the academic literature: the mitigation of
information asymmetries, the building and sustaining of customer relationships and the
reduction of financing costs.
To date, very little work has been undertaken on the actuality of firms’ management of
trade credit, giving consideration to how they might shape and organise themselves
effectively. Treated as a technical function, trade credit management is simply a set of
techniques and processes. However, the evidence indicates that, when relegated to this role,
trade credit fails to deliver promisedpossibilities. Rather, good trade creditmanagementhas
a set of essential relational attributes that cannot be explored or tested using the positivist
approaches of much mainstream trade credit research.
Ours is the first substantial in-depth qualitative study of how trade credit is actually
managed within the firm at the relational level. The data allow exploration of the reasons why
firmsmightormightnotrealisethestrategicadvantagesoftradecredit identifiedintheacademic
literature. We found three firm organisational attributes that affect firms’ credit management
practises: the levelof thecredit team’sskillsandawareness, communicationofcredit information
and the structural position of the activity in the firm. These attributes provide appropriate
analytical lenses throughwhich the relational nature offirms’ trade creditwork canbe explored.
This paper offers a rich set of contrasting stories of firms that exhibited extremely
heterogeneous arrangements with regard to their trade credit management. The successful
firms had successfully adapted to their circumstances and were proactive in their
engagement. Skills, communication and structural position within the firm are obviously
significantly interlinked and, in these firms, these factors came together effectively.
We found that in companies where trade credit was performed by skilled credit teams
aware of their importance and who communicated credit information to others across the
organisation from the vantage point of an appropriate structural position took a more
strategic approach to trade credit management and realised many of the benefits. For
instance, we found that firms offering good quality products/services did not offer longer
(than required) credit terms and did not allow customers to pay beyond due dates without
penalty. In addition, those who assessed customers’ risk before the sales had less late
payment and default problems. Thus efficient trade credit management cut firms’ credit
costs.
Very noticeably, the structural position of the credit function was highly
significant. In cases where the function was appropriately positioned within the firm
and the staff had sufficient influence, trade credit was used strategically to obtain
competitive advantage.
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In contrast, firmswhere the dominant culturewas onewhere creditmanagementwas
equatedwith “sales prevention” did not invest in credit staff, who, in turn, did not exhibit
a clear and skilled commitment to their work, seeing themselves only as back-end debt
collectors. These credit teamswere often structurally isolated from key decision-makers
and had poor lines of communication. The result was, in many instances, a palpable
failure to achieve even basic business efficiencies.
We can identify no single framework to determine exactly how trade credit
management should be practiced within firms. To a significant extent, this depends on
the individuals circumstances that pertain. Rather, this work highlights the importance
of three general organisational attributes and stresses the importance of making these
appropriate to the context of the individual firm.
This conclusion should not be startling. However, in the UK and elsewhere, trade
credit continues to be a vexing problem with frequently poor control and a failure to
realise the strategic competitive advantages that can accrue. It may be that largely
quantitative academic research, which has rationalised trade credit as a set of
narrow functional processes, leads to proposed solutions that are simply more of the
same – for instance, in the UK, government has sought to deal with the issue by the
introduction of statutory interest provisions (Paul and Boden, 2011). This work
therefore offers the prospect of a somewhat different conceptualisation of trade
credit management as a relational aspect of a firm’s control, deserving of thoughtful
and nuanced solutions.
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Table AI.
Respondent group by firm
size
Size (by number of employees) Number of companies % of companies Cumulative %
Micro (10) 5 12.50 12.50
Small (10-49) 4 10.00 22.00
Medium (50-249) 6 15.00 37.50
Large (249) 25 62.50 100.00
Total 40 100.00 100.00
Table AII.
Respondent group by
sector
Sectors Number of companies % of companies
Services 10 25.00
Construction/building/engineering 13 32.50
IT/software 8 20.00
Food/drink distribution 4 10.00
Others (publishing, electronics, promotional
goods, manufacturing/distribution) 5 12.50
Total 40 100.00
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